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Embedded security: definition (1)
Old Model (simplified view):
-Attack on channel between communicating parties
-Encryption and cryptographic operations in black boxes
-Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols
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Embedded security: definition (2)
New Model (also simplified view):
-Attack channel and endpoints
-Encryption and cryptographic operations in gray boxes
-Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols
-Protection by secure implementation
Need secure implementations not only algorithms
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Embedded Security: definition (3)
NEED BOTH
• Efficient, lightweight implementations
– Within power, area, timing budgets
– Public key: 2048 bits RSA, 200 bit ECC on 8 bit C and 100 W
– Public key on a passive RFID tag 
• Trustworthy implementation
– Resistant to attacks
– Active attacks: probing, power glitches, JTAG scan chain
– Passive attacks: side channel attacks
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Illustrate with examples
• Example 1: Secret Key: KATAN, KTANTAN
• Example 2: NIST SHA3 – how not to do it
• Example 3: Public key for RFID
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Secret key: KATAN, KTANTAN
Christophe De Cannière, Orr Dunkelman and 
Miroslav Knežević
CHES 2009
[slide courtesy: M. Knežević]
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KATAN/KTANTAN Design Goal
• Minimum logic (i.e. gates) to implement a secret key algorithm
Alternatives:
• Stream ciphers
– To ensure security, the internal state must be twice the size of the key.
– No good methodology on how to design these.
• Use a standardized block cipher:  AES
– The smallest implementation consumes 3.1 Kgates.
– Designed for HW and SW implementations
• Other block ciphers?
– HIGHT, mCrypton, DESL, PRESENT,…
– Can we do better/different?
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Design Goals
• Secure block cipher
– Address Differential/Linear cryptanalysis, Related-Key/Slide 
attacks, Related-Key differentials, Algebraic attacks.
• Efficient block cipher
– Small foot-print, Low power consumption, Reasonable 
performance (+ possible speed-ups).
• Application driven
– Does an RFID tag always need to support a key agility?
– Some low-end devices have one key throughout their life 
cycle.
– Some of them encrypt very little data.
– Tune algorithm to the application!
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KATAN/KTANTAN Block Ciphers
• Block ciphers based on Trivium
(its 2 register version – Bivium).
• Block size: 32/48/64 bits. 
• Key size: 80 bits.
• Share the same number of rounds – 254.
• KATAN and KTANTAN are the same up to the key 
schedule.
• In KTANTAN, the key is fixed and cannot be changed!
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Block Cipher – HW perspective
Block size
Key size
MemoryDatapath + Control“redundant” logic
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Design Rationale – Memory Issues (1)
• For a more compact cipher, a larger ratio of the area is 
dedicated for storing the intermediate values and key bits.
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Design Rationale – A Story of a Single Bit
• Assume we have a parallel load of the key and the plaintext.
• A single Flip-Flop has no relevance – MUXes need to be used.
• 2to1 MUX + FF = Scan FF:  Beneficial both for area and power.
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Design Rationale – Control Part
• How to control such a simple construction?
 IR stands for Irregular update Rule.
 We basically need a counter only. Can it be simpler than 
that?
 Let the LFSR that is in charge of IR play the role of a counter.
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KATAN32 – Control Part
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0T 1-bit
ready
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Implementation Results
• All designs are synthesized with Synopsys Design Vision 
version Y-2006.06, using UMC 0.13µm Low-Leakage CMOS 
library.
* Throughput is estimated for frequency of 100 kHz.
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SHA3 – competition:
how not to do it
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“Flexibility” Requirements
• Wide range of 
platforms
• Wide range of 
message digests
[of course, also security requirements]
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SHA-3: “cost” requirements
• Power 
consumption?
• Energy to hash 
one message?
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SHA3- results
• NIST asks for a Swiss knife
• But often you need a 
specialized knife
• Certainly for embedded 
applications
Bread knife
Surgeon’s 
knife
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High-Throughput Implementations
http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/SHA-3_Hardware_Implementations
SHA-3, Fully Autonomous, Tillich et al. Benchmarking
SHA-3, Core Functionality, Various Authors
SHA-3, Fully Autonomous, Various Authors
* Scaled to 0.18µm CMOS technology
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SHA 3 gate counts
[slide courtesy: Miroslav Knežević]
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SHA3 conclusion
• SHA3 Hash functions are HUGE compared to:
• Secret key algorithms
– AES: from 3000 gates and up
– KATAN: around 1000 gates
• Public key algorithms
– ECC: around 10.000 gates
• Throughput similar to
– High speed secret key implementations
NEED: domain specific hash functions
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Public Key: ECC for RFID
[slide courtesy: 
Yong Ki Lee, 
Lejla Batina]
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Challenge 1: security problems
Scalability
26
Replay Attack
Anti-cloning
Privacy
…
EC-RAC
Protocol
Schnorr
Protocol
Okamoto
Protocol
DoS
Public key 
Crypto
Ingrid Verbauwhede, K.U.Leuven - COSIC 14
IEEE Benelux - BCRYPT workshop – 27 June 24, 2010
Challenge 1: Security problems
• Current RFID standards:
– No security
– Or simple self-destruct password (8 to 32 bits)
• Security challenges RFID:
– Anti-cloning (make it difficult to ‘copy’ RFID)
– Replay attack (query the tag and reuse that info)
– ‘Tracking’ attacks => privacy problems
– Scalability: security for large sets of tags 
– Backward/forward un-traceability
Needs Public key 
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Challenge 2: design constraints
Side-channel 
Attacks  
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Challenge 2: constraints
Passive RFID tag:
• Area: less than 20.000 gates 
• Low Power: total budget varies from 50 to 100 
microWatt
• Budget for crypto: less than 15 microWatt!
• Clock frequency: factor of 13.56 MHz
• Execution time target: one point multiplication 
less than 250 msec.   
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Design Steps
• Step 1: protocols
Security dreams
Physical realityPhysical reality
??
• Step 2: algorithms
• Step 3: arithmetic
• Step 4: processor
• Step 5: circuits
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Step 1: Solutions with Asymmetric-key 
Algorithms
• Conventional public-key authentication
– Schnorr protocol, Okamoto Protocol
– Vulnerable against the tracking attack
• GPS scheme
– A variant of Schnorr protool
– Secure transfer of a tag’s ID is not solved
• Rabin Encryption
– Requires a large key size and transmission
– A compact architecture : WiSec’09(Feldhofer,Oren)
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A General EC Authentication Protocol 
(Schnorr protocol)
   
xPrPxr
rPrxrPrryPR




1
22
1
2121
1
21 )(
 A tag’s public key can be derived using exchanged messages
=> tracking attack
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Observation for RFID Protocols?
 Minimize the computation load on tags
 We need to transfer computation load to the reader/server 
as much as possible
 We cannot just transfer ID of a tag
 A tag’s ID is what we need to keep in secret to avoid 
tracking
 The protocol is a “many to one” protocol
 A tag’s public key (xP) does not need to be publicly known
 It can be securely stored and used in the server 
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Step 2: EC based Security Processor
– Operations we need (e.g. EC-RAC)
• Modular Operation
– Modular Multiplication: rs1∙x1 (mod n)
– Modular Addition: rt1+rs1x1 (mod n) 
=>  Perform on a 8-bit specialized Micro-Controller
• EC Point multiplication
– rt1∙P, (rt1+rs1x1)∙Y
=> Perform on a 163 bit Elliptic Curve co-processor
8 bit versus 163 bit ?? modulo operations are less frequent 
and not time critical, hence multiplex mod operations
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Overall architecture
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Step 3: EC Point Multiplication
a+b, a∙b, a2
Modular Arithmetic Operation
(Addition, Multiplication, Squaring)
P+Q, 2∙P
Point Addition,
Point Doubling
k∙P
Scalar 
Multiplication
Montgomery 
Algorithm
Lopez-Dahab
Algorithm
Sakiyama
Modular ALU
≈600 GE (Control)
* GE: Gate Equivalent (a 2-input NAND)
≈1.2k GE (Control)
+ 6×163 registers
≈900 GE (Control)
+ 3×163 registers
Total Area = 2.7 GE (Control) + 9×163 registers ≈ 80% !!
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Step 4: Optimization Approach
– Reduce Registers: 9→5 (4 registers reduction)
• Common Z-coordinate system : 1 register ↓
• Redesign Modular ALU : 1 register ↓
• Register reuse : 2 registers ↓
– ‘Point Add/Dbl algorithm’ and ‘Modular ALU’
– Reduce Multiplexer Complexity
• A special Circular Shift Register File
• Extra 30% reduction in the register file
– Side Channel Resistant
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Modular ALU (MALU)
Multiplication: 163/d 
Squaring:       1 
Addition:       1
Operation   : Cycles
Share XOR array
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Circular Shift Register
Cost: need more cycles to get data in correct register …
Overall cost: less than 2% compared to point multiplication
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Register File Management: shift example
Add
Square
Swap
Shift
Shift
Shift
Multiply
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Estimated numbers
• Results: ECC co-processor that can compute:
– ECC point multiplications (163 by 4)
– Scalar modular operations (8 bit processor with redundancy)
• Schnorr (secure ID transfer, but no tracking protection): one PM
• More advanced protocols: up to four PM on tag
• Technology: 0.13 micron CMOS low power version
• Size: d=4, 14.500 gates, 
• Time: 60.000 cycles for one PM
• Clock at 616 KHz, 97 msec for one PM at 22 microWatt
Area
[ECC Processor]
51%
20%
29%
Registe
r File
MALU
μC
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Conclusion
Shows ONE path:
• Protocol design: 
randomized access
• Public key: ECC many 
design options
• Architecture: 8 bit micro 
& 163 EC processor
• Specialized register file
• Full custom layout
Security dreams
Physical realityPhysical reality
??
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Future work:
• Do we have all the required 
properties covered?
• Can privacy issues be 
optional, at least for some 
applications?
• Light weight crypto?
• How to store keys securely?
• Use physical properties: PUF 
based security ?
• What about side-channel 
security?
Security dreams
??
Physical realityPhysical reality
